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Este artículo evalúa el impacto de los factores no monetarios en la inflación para una muestra de 97 
países en el período 1975-2005, complementando y ampliando la literatura existente en las 
siguientes dimensiones: (i) se conforma un conjunto exhaustivo de determinantes de la inflación 
clasificados en 5 grupos: inflación alta y persistencia, regímenes monetarios y cambiarios, apertura, 
variables estructurales e instituciones, y variables relativas al ciclo económico. (ii) Estimamos una 
especificación amplia usando técnicas econométricas y frecuencias de datos alternativas (por ej.: 
promedios anuales y quinquenales) para evaluar la dinámica inflacionaria de corto y de largo plazo 
por separado. (iii) Testeamos la sensibilidad de nuestros resultados a distintos grupos de países y a 
través del tiempo. Nuestras conclusiones muestran que: (a) las medidas que fomentan la disciplina y 
la credibilidad son esenciales para reducir la inflación. Encontramos que los países que adoptan 
regímenes de metas de inflación o de tipo de cambio fijo consiguen reducir la tasa de inflación. La 
apertura financiera y saldos fiscales saludables también ejercen un efecto disciplinario en la 
inflación de corto plazo. (b) Los países con mayor ingreso per cápita tienen tasas de inflación más 
bajas. (c) Curiosamente, la brecha de producto interna tiene un efecto positivo que es mayor en los 
países industrializados que en las economías en desarrollo. (d) No encontramos un efecto 






This paper evaluates the impact of non-monetary factors on inflation for a sample of 97 countries 
over the period 1975-2005. We complement and extend the existing literature in the following 
dimensions: (i) we assemble a comprehensive set of inflation determinants classified in 5 groups —
high inflation and persistence, monetary and exchange rate regimes, openness, structural variables 
and institutions, and business-cycle-related variables. (ii) We estimate broad specification using 
alternative econometric techniques and frequencies of data (e.g. annual and 5-year-averages) to 
assess separately for short -term and long-term inflation dynamics. (iii) We test the sensitivity of our 
results to different country groups and over time. Our findings mainly show that: (a) discipline and 
credibility enhancing effects are crucial in lowering inflation. We find that countries that adopted 
either inflation targeting or fixed exchange rate regimes attain lower inflation rates. Financial 
openness and healthy fiscal balances also exerted a disciplinary effect on inflation in the short run. 
(b) Countries with higher income per capita have lower inflation rates. (c) Interestingly, domestic 
output gap has a positive effect that is higher in industrial countries than in developing ones. (d) We 
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Introduction 
 
The idea of inflation being ultimately a monetary phenomenon and that the 
monetary authority is the final responsible agent of inflation is hard to rebate.  A similar 
general consensus is reached about the deleterious impact on economic performance and 
social welfare of high inflation (Fischer, Sahay and Végh, 2002). In this context, why do 
some monetary authorities have incentives to inflate? Why do we experience episodes of 
sustained high inflation? The answer lies mostly on the short-run gains that might be 
accomplished through the creation of inflation; such as seigniorage and the financing of 
fiscal deficits, attempts to exploit a negative relationship between unemployment and 
inflation, or the alleviation of the nominal debt burden of the public sector. Such time-
inconsistency problems are more likely to arise in countries with weak institutions that lack 
of the discipline to prevent monetary authorities from focusing on short-run objectives.
1 
By institutions, we here convey the notion of a sound macroeconomic policy framework, 
the quality of the bureaucracy, and the sustainability of monetary and fiscal arrangements 
that transcend the political business cycle. This paper seeks to asses the effects of such 
non-monetary factors on inflation. 
 
Inflation rates are very different across countries and over time, due to various historical 
country-specific causes. Figure 1 plots the heterogeneity of such inflationary outcomes.
2 
While some regions experience mild positive inflation, others (especially developing 
countries) display very high inflation rates. Nevertheless, in spite of this heterogeneity of 
inflation rates, we can distinguish two well-known periods. The first one is the Great 
Inflation of the mid-seventies and eighties. While industrial countries had abnormally 
persistent two-digit inflation rates, several developing countries experienced disastrous 
hyperinflation episodes (see Fischer et al., 2002). On the other hand, the last fifteen years, 
have been characterized by a cross-regional disinflationary process that converged to one 
digit inflation in most countries in the world by the year 2001 and has been referred to as 
the Great Disinflation (see IMF 2007, Summers 2005)
3. The beginning of such convergence 
                                                 
1 The question about the welfare preference between long-run and short-run objectives of monetary 
policy has been well debated in the literature, and therefore not discussed in this paper. For a more 
detailed discussion on the positive theory of time inconsistency see Barro and Gordon (1983) and 
Kydland and Prescott (1977). Implications of such trade-off are discussed in Chari (1988). 
2 Inflation for each region and for the World is calculated as the PPP-GDP weighted average of country 
individual inflation data for each year.  
3 This period (and our sample) does not account for the recent months of persistent high inflation. 
Inflation rates across the world however, although high, are not comparable to inflation rates in the of the 
Great Inflation era.    2
process in developing countries began with stabilization programs and reform agendas 
implemented in the late 80s and early 90s that dealt with crisis episodes marked with hyper 
and high-inflation and financial stress. Weak institutions and policy practices were severely 
questioned and frequently replaced with stronger and better-defined ones. This sharp shift 
in macroeconomic policy conduct, along with support programs from supra-national 
institutions achieved macroeconomic stabilization through the years, such that world 
inflation was below 3.5 percent in 2005 (see Figure 2)  
 
Previous empirical literature attempting to document the non-monetary determinants of 
inflation in a cross-country setup is broad and diverse in its conclusions. However, most of 
it usually addresses few determinants of inflation at the time, and does so for a limited 
number of countries or for restrictive periods of time and does not check for robustness of 
results with alternative estimation techniques. 
 
This paper extends the preceding literature in several dimensions. First, we consider a 
broad and comprehensive specification that attempts to encompass previous partial 
specifications. We assemble a large dataset of 97 countries for 31 years (1975-2005). This 
period includes both, the rising and the declining periods known as the “great inflation” 
and the “great disinflation”. Second, we estimate the inflation dynamics for two sets of data 
with different frequency —annual and five-year average data— that attempts to determine 
the factors driving short- and long-run inflation. Third, we examine the sensitivity of our 
results to the use of alternative estimation techniques and compare their results. Finally, we 
test the robustness of these results to alternative specifications that allow for slope 
heterogeneity across country groups and over time.  
 
Following the abundant theory and empirics on the determinants of inflation, we classify 
our comprehensive set of determinants into five groups of variables: (a) high inflation 
episodes and persistence, (b) monetary and exchange rate regimes in place, (c) institutional 
and structural variables, (d) external and openness-related variables and (e) cyclical variables 
that affect inflation in the short-run.  
 
This paper is divided in 5 sections. Section 2 presents a detailed discussion of each of the 
included variables in our inflation regression equation as classified in the groups mentioned 
above. Section 3 describes the equation specification and the different econometric   3
approaches used for estimation. Section 4 describes the statistical properties of our data 
and discusses our empirical assessment. Finally, section 5 concludes 
 
2.  Related Literature  
 
Table 1 summarizes previous cross-country studies on the determinants of inflation.  There 
is abundant literature on the assessment of differences in inflation performance across 
countries. However, some of the earlier research has focused on particular institutional —
say, central bank independence (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti, 1992)— and on country-
case studies. In Table 1, we focus mainly on recent cross-country and panel-data evidence.  
 






Δ = π to avoid giving excess weight to outlier episodes of high inflation 
and hyperinflation in the distribution of errors. Our set of explanatory variables is divided 
in the following categories: (a) high inflation episodes, (b) monetary regimes, (c) structural 
and institutional variables, (d) cyclical variables, and (e) openness. 
 
High Inflation Episodes. We distinguish three variables in this category. We control here for 
episodes of high inflation and hyperinflation using binary variables; we follow Dornbusch 
and Fischer (1993) to define them. Hyperinflation is defined as the episode in which annual 
inflation exceeds 1000 percent, high inflation refers to those episodes of annual inflation 
exceeding 50 percent on an annual basis.
4 Fischer, Sahay and Végh (2002) point out that 
there are several reasons to isolate these extreme but infrequent episodes: (a) 
hyperinflations are very costly and countries are not willing to tolerate them for more than 
very few years or even for only some months. Hence, some hyperinflation episodes may 
not be accounted for by annual datasets. (b) Linear estimation models tend to severely 
over-estimate the impact of inflation on macroeconomic performance compared 
estimations using samples of countries where this phenomenon is absent.
 5 
 
                                                 
4 Cagan (1956) defined hyperinflation episodes as beginning in the month when monthly inflation first 
exceeds 50 percent and ending in the month before the monthly inflation drops below 50 percent for at 
least a year. This yields an annual inflation that exceeds 12875 percent. 
5 Even after relaxing such definition, our definition of hyperinflation accounts for hyperinflation 
episodes in Argentina, Bulgaria, Bolivia, Brazil, Croatia, Nicaragua, Peru and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo.   4
We also account for inflationary inertia. There are several reasons as for which inflation 
would not be time-independent. First, if prices are set optimally in a forward looking manner 
and there exists some kind of nominal rigidity then it is optimal for firms to set higher 
prices in advance when they rationally expect overall price level to rise. Second, literature 
on the effect of indexation mechanisms shows that there is a self-perpetuating component 
of inflation in the presence of such adjustment mechanisms. For instance, if wages or other 
prices (e.g. regulated service tariffs, home rents and others) are indexed to past inflation 
then it is incorrect to neglect such a component. Both sets of reasons can not be ruled out 
a priori, especially when working in a panel data setup.  
 
Monetary Regimes. We control for two types of monetary arrangements which have been 
extensively studied in the literature. First, we create a binary variable that takes the value of 
1 for countries have adopted inflation targeting (IT) regimes, and 0 otherwise. Inflation 
targeting is an operational framework for monetary policy aimed at achieving a numerical 
value (or range) for the inflation rate; therefore, its adoption should undoubtedly be 
incorporated. Empirical evidence on the effect of adopting IT regimes mostly concludes 
that IT lowers inflation and inflation expectations and reduces its volatility (Truman, 2003; 
Hyvonen, 2004 and Vega and Winkelried, 2005 among others).  IT has some detractors 
though; Ball and Sheridan (2005) argue that IT makes no difference among industrial 
countries and that the apparent success of ITers in the period of global disinflation —when 
inflation experiences a reversion towards the mean— is sample-dependent. On the other 
hand, Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2007) find that the largest benefits of inflation 
reduction among ITers is experienced by emerging market economies and converging-to-
target ITers, and show that the choice of the control group is key for finding any effect of 
IT on inflation. In our large data set the control group would be comprised by most 
countries of the world and for a time-period that nests converging-to-target ITers. A priori 
we could expect a negative, or at least non-significant, effect of IT regime on inflation level. 
 
Second, we account for the effects of the exchange rate regime in place on the differences 
in inflation performance. We expect inflation to be lower in countries that adopted fixed 
exchange rate regimes —with the impact being even stronger in countries with hard pegs 
(Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger, 2001). Usually, countries that adopt fixed exchange rate 
regimes are precisely those that suffer high inflation and that eventually lower it. Second, 
fixed exchange rate regimes operate as a disciplinary tool for monetary authorities, limiting   5
their ability to indefinitely expand monetary base at the risk of causing a balance of 
payments crisis. Third, fixed exchange rate regimes also have a signaling effect that 
enhances credibility of lower future inflation. This credibility would help anchor inflation 
expectations thus lowering actual inflation. Evidence on the negative association between 
inflation and pegs can be found in Cottarelli et al. (1998), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2001), and Husain, Mody and Rogoff (2005).  
 
Structural and Institutional Variables. Inflation can be self-perpetuating because it entails the 
accomplishment of some short-run objective for monetary authorities. Among such 
incentives we have the ability to exploit a negative relationship between unemployment and 
inflation, financing public deficit through inflation tax or alleviating the real value or public 
nominal debt burden. These motives to create inflation are heterogeneously used in 
accordance to the institutional framework in place. High quality institutions would prevent 
such time-inconsistent policies to be adopted and thus lower inflation (Cukierman 1992a, 
Aisen and Veiga 2007). We include two measures of quality of institutions in our general 
specification; a measure of democratic accountability, which reflects the strength of the 
government to endure short-run demands in favor of long-run welfare-enhancing policies, 




A third structural variable is the ability of the government to collect taxes. The fiscal theory 
of inflation predicts that, the weaker the revenue system is, or the more excessive public 
spending is, the more likely it is that a country will choose to make use of seigniorage to 
finance public spending beyond tax revenue (Sargent and Wallace 1981, Cukierman 1992b, 
Phelps 1973, Végh 1989). Thus, we include in our specification the fiscal surplus to GDP 
ratio. Although theoretically appealing, there has not been much empirical success 
supporting this theory. Most of the literature attempting to study this relation finds no 
significance of fiscal indicators on inflation. An exception is Catao and Terrones (2005) 
who find evidence of a positive association between fiscal deficits and inflation.   
 
We include the ratio of domestic credit to private sector to GDP as a proxy of financial 
depth. This variable contains information that is expected to be negatively related to 
inflation. First, it is a proxy of the institutional quality of a country. Second, the more 
                                                 
6 Dollar and Kraay (2003) find that cross-country differences in institutions mirror the differences in the 
levels of GDP per capita.   6
developed financial markets are, the easier it is for a government to finance temporary (and 
sustainable) deficits through borrowing from national residents, making it less likely to 
incur in seigniorage-based revenue. In addition, Posen (1993, 1995) argues that the 
opposition to inflation from the financial sector —which reflects the financial sector’s 
distaste for inflation and its ability to express that distaste— is a significant predictor of 
inflation. Finally, to our knowledge there is no panel data or cross section study that 
accounts for such effect.  
 
Cyclical Variables. We account for the domestic and oil price gap. The latter variable 
influence on production costs requires no further explanation. The first variable finds 
empirical and some theoretical support in the preceding literature. When using annual data, 
it seems appropriate to account for some sort of domestic demand-led inflationary 
pressure. The neo-keynesian framework predicts that there should exist a short-run Phillips 
Curve that relates some measure of economic activity (relative production capacity), to 
inflation (Gali 2007, Gali and Gertler 2004). Furthermore, Clark and McCracken (2006) 
find evidence that output gap does indeed contain valuable information to predict inflation 
in the short-run; thus a priori we do not rule out such relationship.  
 
Openness. We account for the impact of openness on domestic inflation through three 
different dimensions: trade openness, financial openness and the likely effects of global 
shocks.  
 
Regarding trade openness, Romer (1993) finds that OECD countries with a more open trade 
regime have lower inflation. This finding may suggest that trade liberalization strategies 
around the world in recent decades have important monetary consequences, reducing 
inflation along with barriers to trade. Lane (1997) argues that the mechanism that links 
openness to incentives to inflate does not rely on a large-country-effect on terms of trade 
as Romer (1993) suggested, but instead it relies on imperfect competition and nominal 
price rigidity in the non-traded sector. On the other hand, Terra (1998) finds that the 
negative association between trade openness and inflation is stronger among severely-
indebted countries since they have less pre-commitment in monetary policy. Several 
subsequent papers have also found such relationship but mostly for much reduced 
specifications (Gruben and McLeod 2004, Temple 2004 and Borio and Filardo, 2007).  
   7
Capital account openness affects inflation through a different channel. First, according to the 
theory of optimal taxation, financial integration lowers the cost of foreign financing of 
temporary fiscal deficits, making it less likely for governments to use seigniorage and 
creating inflation (Phelps 1973, Aizenman 1992). Second, capital account openness is one 
of the final steps of macroeconomic reforms after improvements in the macroeconomic 
policy framework. Such improvements include fiscal discipline, central bank independence 
and sound monetary policies. Finally, capital account openness by itself exerts disciplinary 
effects against inflationary monetary policy by neutralizing it under fixed exchange-rate 
regimes or inducing currency substitution and currency depreciation under floating 
exchange-rate regimes. Thus, these consequences raise the costs associated to it and 
enhance credibility of the monetary authority, helping lower inflation (Tytell and Wei, 
2004).  
 
The third dimension of openness included in our regression analysis is the impact of global 
factors on inflation. Recent developments in the world economy have brought to the fore 
the likely influence globalization on domestic inflation —see Helbling et al. (2006). First, it 
has been argued that China and India have exported deflation through their increasing 
trade of non-skilled-labor intensive goods. Although intuitively appealing, this hypothesis 
has also been criticized. Ball (2006) argues that these two countries have changed relative 
prices and not absolute ones so that their entrance in world trade should not affect 
inflation in the long run. Furthermore, if Asian goods are cheaper, consumers are wealthier 
and this income effect would exert inflationary pressures on other markets changing, again, 
relative prices
7. Second, openness comes along with higher competition and market 
flexibility. This would make local firms more prone to put extra effort on cost-control to 
avoid foreign competition to finding it attractive to enter local markets (Rogoff 2004, 
Sbordone 2007). Third, increased competition and integration to world markets can foster 
productivity growth; persistently lowering costs (Grossman and Helpman 1991). Fourth, 
there is the political economy argument of a steeper Phillips Curve, which would make it 
less attractive for central banks to try to exploit the negative relationship between 
unemployment and inflation. If all mechanisms sketched above are operational, nominal 
rigidities are less relevant and the likelihood of price revisions is higher resulting in a 
diminished effect of these on real variables. This makes it less tempting to pursue 
inflationary monetary policy (Rogoff, 2004).  
                                                 
7 Surprisingly this is a candidate explanation, at least partially, to the current inflationary world-wide 
episode.     8
 
In this context, the literature includes the world inflation and the foreign output gap. These 
variables are supposed to exert an analogous influence on domestic inflation through 
imports and exports, by making the first more expensive in world markets and raising 
factor prices necessary to produce the latter. It has even been argued that such factors are 
becoming predominant in inflation dynamics determination (Borio and Filardo 2007). 
Thus, we test for the influence of these global factors on national inflation. 
 
3. Specification and Econometric Approach  
 
  In this section we describe our general specification and the econometric 
approaches we use to estimate such inflation equation and test the robustness of results. 
We begin by focusing on estimation techniques more suitable for annual data (the “short-
run” model) and then we concentrate on econometric methods for five-year averages data.  
 
Our general specification is,
8 
 
t i, i 5 4 3 2 o t i, ε μ ' ' ' ' ' α π + + + + + + + = CYC B STIN B OPN B MERR B INFR B1    (1) 
 
denoting our five groups of variables; inflation-related variables, monetary and exchange-
rate regimes, openness, structural and institutional variables and cyclical variables 
respectively;  i μ  stands for the inclusion of country-specific fixed effects and  t i, ε  is assumed 
to be a well-behaved stochastic error.  
 
We estimate equation (1) using three different econometric techniques. The first two 
approaches use annual data and the third uses five-year averages. 
 
Annual Estimation Techniques 
We first assume slope homogeneity across countries and estimate a standard fixed effects 
panel data equation with instrumental variables to account for likely endogeneity of 
explanatory variables. We instrument the lagged dependent variable, the overall fiscal 
                                                 
8 Again, we define our dependent variable as normalized inflation: 
t i,
t i,
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surplus,
9 national output gap and the inflation targeting regime.  We perform the IV 
estimations using fixed- and random-effects and test the validity of the latter vis-à-vis the 
former.  
 
Second, we distinguish between long-run and short-run components of inflation dynamics. 
We impose slope homogeneity only the long-run parameter vector and allow complete 
heterogeneity, across countries, for the short-run parameters. For this purpose we use the 
Pooled Mean Group estimator proposed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999).  
 
It seems reasonable to assume, theoretically, that inflation is a monetary phenomenon in 
the long-run for all countries, but that the adjustment in the short-run may differ across 
them due to the different degrees of rigidities in goods, labor and asset markets. We run 
our equation (1) as an auto-regressive distributed lag (ARDL) where dependent and 
independent variables enter the right-hand side with lags of order p and q respectively:
10 





j - t i, j i, i t i, ε ' π λ μ π + + + = −
== ∑∑ X Γ      (2) 
where  πi,t  stands for the observed (normalized) inflation rate in group i at time t;  μi 
represents fixed effects; and Xi,t  stands fort the vector of the five-group explanatory 
variables outlined above. As outlined by Calderon et al. (2003), in order to be able to derive 
a long run relationship between πi,t and Xi,t we must obtain a dynamic regression equation 
in which; first, the regression residual is serially uncorrelated and, second, Xi,t is strictly 
exogenous, meaning that it is independent of the residuals at all leads and lags. It is in the 
fulfilling of these conditions that ARDL specification renders its greatest advantage. All 
right hand side variables enter the equation with sufficient lags so as to ensure the second 
exogeneity condition. Another advantage of the method is that standard estimation and 
inference can be used regardless of the integration order of the variables in Xi,t and πi,t . We 
just need to assume that there exists a single long-run relationship and that the error vector 
behaves properly. Then, equation (2) can be re-parameterized using simple algebra as 
shown by Pesaran et al. (1999) yielding the following specification
11 
 
                                                 
9 If we consider that nominal interest rate payments of public debt burden are contingent upon inflation 
rate, then our fiscal surplus variable is correlated to  t i, ε .  
10 The reader interested in the asymptotic properties is referred to Pesaran et al. (1999).In this section we 
provide just the necessary intuition and elements to understand the benefits of such estimation 
technique. 
11 Assuming a general ADRL  p=q=1.   10
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Equation (3) is the equation we estimate. We are especially interested in the long-run 
relationship in which we impose coefficient-homogeneity. The rest of the terms of the right 
hand side of equation (3) are allowed to vary freely across countries.  
 
Briefly, the PMG estimator proceeds as follows. The estimation of the long run coefficients 
is done jointly across countries through a (concentrated) maximum likelihood procedure. 
Then the estimation of short-run coefficients (including the speed of adjustment: i,1 λ 1− ), 
country-specific intercepts, and country-specific error variances is done on a country-by-




Five-year period estimation 
To assess the long-run determinants of inflation we aggregate our annual data to obtain 
five-year averages. This reduces our time dimension relative to our cross-country 
dimension from 31 to 6 periods of observations. We perform such exercise to check for 
robustness of results and to assess the long-run process of inflation determination. On this 
new database we estimate our model using the system-GMM estimator proposed by 
Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), which has been shown to be 
more efficient than the traditional Arellano and Bond (1991) GMM difference estimator, in 
the presence of persistent data. We exclude from these estimations the fifth group of 
variables (cyclical) because, by definition, these should exert influence on inflation only in 
the short-run. 
 
On a second stage we extend our general specification in equation (1) allowing for possible 
slope heterogeneity for country group and time clusters. We augment equation (1) with 
interactive grouping dummy variables. Thus equation (1) is a particular case of equation (4) 
shown below. 
 
                                                 
12 In order to ensure the independence of residuals across countries, which is fundamental to ensure 
consistency of our PMG estimates, we allow for time-specific effects in the estimated regression. This is 
done through introducing each variable as deviation with respect to the cross sectional mean for every 
period.   11
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The grouping-dummy (Dc) clusters observations in three different ways, which are 
estimated separately. First, it separates countries according to their income level: low and 
middle-income-countries vis-a-vis high-income-countries, and low-income-countries with 
respect to high and middle-income-countries. Second, it separates observations according 
to time periods, contrasting the period before and after 1995. Next section details such 
results as well as the general specification estimations.  
 
4.  Empirical Assessment 
 
Before we present the analysis of our results, we briefly describe some statistical properties 
of the data, focusing primarily on the characteristics of inflation. Figure 3 depicts the cross-
country kernel density plot of the distribution of inflation rates around the world for each 
year. The vertical axis shows the density function value and the horizontal axis shows levels 
of inflation. We find that first, second and third moments of the distribution of inflation 
rates are larger for the late 1970s than their equivalent measures for the early 2000s. This 
means that more and more countries are gathering around low levels of inflation; a 
phenomenon that does not seem to have reached an end to date.  
 
Figure 4 plots medians, percentile 25th and 75th for four relevant variables included in our 
regression model: inflation, capital account openness, fiscal surplus and domestic credit to 
private sector for each year. It also shows the evolution of the number of countries under 
the different exchange rate regimes (pegs, intermediates and floats) and under inflation 
targeting regimes for all years in our sample.  
 
An important issue, relevant to the estimation of the inflation regressions, is the potential 
co-linearity between our regressors. For instance, per capita income is a variable that 
summarizes many features of institutional quality and is very likely to be highly correlated 
with other variables that contain information on institutions and regimes such as 
democratic accountability, the adoption of inflation targeting, domestic private credit, trade 
openness and capital openness. Table 2 reports pair-wise correlation coefficients for 
inflation and its determinants. Cross-section and panel correlations are reported in the   12
upper- and lower-diagonal of the correlation matrix, respectively. We find that although 
many variables are significantly correlated with each other, indicators that capture 
institutional strength display the highest correlations – normally above 0.5. Therefore, in 
our estimations we are especially careful when including all variables at the same time, 
checking for robustness if one of such (institutional) variables is not included.  
 
We organize our results in 4 groups of tables. First we estimate equation (1) with three 
different estimation techniques which we define in section 3; tables 3 to 5. Then, we restrict 
ourselves to using Fixed Effect Instrumental Variables estimation approach for annual data 
and System-GMM for five-year averages data for three sets of modifications to equation 
(4)
13. The difference between such sets of estimations is the definition we give to the 
grouping dummy variable (Dc); first it clusters non-high-income versus high-income 
economies for the FEIV estimator (Table 6) and for the System-GMM estimator (Table 9), 
then it clusters low income versus non-low-income economies (Tables 7 and 10), and 
finally it clusters observations in time periods; before and after 1995 (Tables 8 and 11).  
 
In Tables 3 to 5 we report different estimations that begin with general specifications and 
end up with particular reduced ones. Then, for the tables in which we use the grouping 
dummy variable, we report only our particular reduced form equations so as to make 
comparisons to our baseline model. For each equation we separate in two columns the 
estimation parameters of equation (1) (nested in equation 4) and in the same row we show 
the differential effect associated to the interaction of the respective variable and the 
grouping dummy variable (Dc). 
 
4.1 Fixed-Effects IV Estimation  
 
Table 3 reports our main results for equation (1). Columns (1A) and (1B) report the results 
for the same specification assuming fixed-effects (FE) and random-effects (RE), 
respectively. We perform a standard Hausman test to verify the validity of such 
assumptions. This test favors the FE estimator. Such procedure is performed and not 
reported for the rest of the columns in this table. Column (4) reports our final specification 
                                                 
13 We do not use the PMG estimation approach due to the requirement of large T and large N it 
demands. Equation 4 more than doubles the number of parameters to be estimated and would require a 
longer period of time than the one we can use. See Pesaran et al. (1999) for more details on such 
requirements.  
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in which we have excluded non-significant explanatory variables found in columns (1A, B), 
(2) and (3)
14. We deal with the likely endogeneity of the explanatory variables by using 
lagged values of all potentially-endogenous variables —that is, the adoption of inflation 
targeting, fiscal surplus, per capita income and national output gap. 
 
Our subsequent discussion will focus on the estimations presented in columns (3) and (4) 
of Table 3 —our preferred specifications. After controlling for hyperinflations and high 
inflations, inflation does present a persistence component, although it tends to be non-
significant in the final estimation. On average, Inflation Targeters have lower inflation of 
approximately 5-6 percent. This result remains unchanged after controlling for reverse 
causality. Also, countries with fixed exchange rate regimes usually display lower rates of 
inflation. This confirms the prior that de-facto fixed exchange rate regimes foster monetary 
discipline and enhance the credibility of the monetary authority.  
 
Trade openness does not seem to affect inflation at standard significance levels, in contrast 
to the negative association found in previous studies. However, it is likely that the negative 
association may be found for specific country groups as suggested by Terra (1998). On the 
other hand, capital account openness does seem to play an important role in lowering the 
level of inflation and its estimated coefficient is robust to changes in specification
15.  
 
As expected, fiscal deficits are associated to higher inflation. This result seems robust to the 
inclusion and exclusion of other variables. A notable issue arises when comparing the 
estimates coefficients of fiscal balance reported in columns (2) and (3) —the former uses 
lagged fiscal surplus whereas the latter uses the instrumented contemporaneous fiscal 
surplus. We can see that controlling for such endogeneity is crucial in order to find support 
to the fiscal theory of inflation, and that the latter coefficient roughly doubles our initial 
estimation. This result has only been previously found by Catao and Terrones (2003). 
Finally, the cyclical component of oil price does have a positive effect on inflation, as well 
as the domestic output gap. However, the coefficient of the latter is lower when accounting 
for endogeneity, although still significant and positive.  
                                                 
14 In this sense, columns (2) and (3) are shown only to support our preferred specification in column (4). 
15 An anonymous referee suggested including this two variables (trade and capital account openness) one 
at the time. This did not change the robustness of the coefficient capital account parameter. Trade 
openness, however, remained non-significant or mildly positive (and very sensitive to other variables 
included).  Table 2, which contains pair-wise correlations, shows a low (but significant) correlation of 0.3 
between these two variables.    14
 
4.2 Pooled Mean Group Estimation (PMGE) 
 
This subsection discusses our estimation of equation (3). In contrast to the econometric 
technique of section 4.1, we use the pooled mean group estimator (PMGE) developed by 
Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1999) which accounts for the heterogeneity in the short-run 
inflation dynamics and (unlike FE or FEIV estimators) only imposes long-run parameters 
homogeneity, after testing the validity of this assumption.
16 
 
Table 4 shows the results of estimation of equation 1 using the pooled mean group (first 
four columns), the mean group estimator (second four columns) and the Dynamic Fixed-
Effects estimator (third set of four columns). We report four different specifications that 
run from general to particular and repeat such estimation for every estimation procedure so 
that the equations are comparable across econometric techniques. The mean group (MG) 
estimator, which is the average of country estimates, is also consistent but is less efficient 
than the PMG estimator under the null hypothesis of long run slope homogeneity. Finally, 
the dynamic fixed-effects (DFE) estimator assumes perfect homogeneity in long-run and 
short-run coefficients. The last four columns in table 3 show the Hausman test that 
assesses the validity of the null hypothesis of long run slope homogeneity. Thus, a high 
enough p-value allows us to not reject the null and prefer the PMG estimator over the MG 
estimator.  
 
The regressions in columns (1) and (2) set our initial general specifications. Column (3) 
shows a particular estimation in which we have left aside non-significant variables and 
column (4) differs from (3) in the rejection of slope homogeneity for all coefficients. The 
Hausman test rejects slope homogeneity for the national output gap so that not all 
countries have the same Phillips Curve slope. Thus, column (4) imposes long-run 
homogeneity of coefficients for all parameter in the long-run vector but not for the 
                                                 
16 As discussed in section 3, one must choose between different assumptions when deciding which 
econometric technique to use. On the one hand one can fully neglect slope heterogeneity by using fixed 
effects models (Panel IV or GMM) or one can accept complete heterogeneity by estimating any model 
on a country-by-country basis. The latter approach, however, takes no advantage of the richness of a 
panel dataset. Thus the choice among these estimators faces a general trade-off between consistency and 
efficiency. Estimators that impose homogeneity dominate heterogeneous estimators in terms of 
efficiency but are inconsistent if the null hypothesis of slope homogeneity is not true. (Pesaran et al 
1999). In the middle of such extreme choices is the PMG estimator which, assumes that there exists 
heterogeneity in short-run dynamics but homogeneity in the long-run dynamics. This is very likely to be 
true in our case. The theory of inflation cannot be country-specific, but one cannot expect every country 
(with different institutional setups and market development) to behave identically.   15
national output gap. After allowing for such heterogeneity, we can be certain that the PMG 
estimator is consistent. Notably, coefficient estimations are practically unchanged, which 
reflects the robustness of the results.  
 
The estimated parameters of our inflation equation show that our estimations are robust 
and very similar to those found with the FE-IV estimator.
17 Again, inflation targeting 
lowers inflation by 5-6 percent and fixed exchange rate regime induces lower inflation. 
Interestingly the latter effect is half as important as that of IT. Trade openness is positively 
related to inflation, although its effect is mild. Capital account openness has a negative and 
robust effect, thus confirming the hypothesis that financial openness may bring discipline 
to monetary policy and, hence, lower inflation. The fiscal surplus and the level of domestic 
inflation have a long-run negative relationship, supporting the fiscal theory of inflation, 
though our estimates show a little higher elasticity value than the one reported (0.14) in 
Catao and Terrones (2005).  
 
Per capita income does not have a robust coefficient estimate in our model, and the same 
holds for domestic private credit.  Domestic output gap exerts positive and significant 
influence on inflation, denoting that these are mostly induced by aggregate demand. In 
contrast, the coefficient of the gap in oil prices is statistically not different from zero. 
Finally, the adjustment velocity is very similar to that reported in previous studies and is 
negative and highly significant.  
 
4.3 GMM-IV System Estimator 
 
Our model of inflation determinants is finally estimated using a different approach to 
control for the endogeneity that accounts for the dynamic nature of inflation and the 
presence of unobservable (country- and time-) effects. We apply the Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell Bond (1998) system-GMM estimator to five-year averages of the data, 
                                                 
17 The careful reader can notice that our specification is not exactly the same as in the FE IV model. 
This is due to dropping the hyperinflation indicator. We do not choose such specification arbitrarily, but 
because of sample properties. The ARDL specification requirement is large T and large N. In contrast to 
system GMM which requires large N and short T and IVFE that requires moderate T. In the ARDL 
specification T should be large enough for every variable so as to allow for the numerous variables in 
levels and in some cases also in differences. After dropping countries for which not even the MG 
estimator can be computed and dropping data properly as in any unbalanced panel estimation, we are 
left with four observations of hyperinflation in our whole sample that happen to have missing 
observations for other important variables, the Peruvian and Nicaraguan hyperinflations of the late 80’s.    16
and the results for the full sample of countries are reported for different specifications in 
Table 5.  
 
The estimated coefficients are very similar to those reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the high 
inflation binary variable, inflation targeting, exchange rate regime, and openness variables. 
However, some differences arise. First, trade openness, which was found to be positively 
correlated to inflation, is not significant in the long-run. Second, the relevant measure of 
external inflation, which controls for global shocks, has an important effect on global 
inflation. Finally, income per capita and domestic credit are not significant when included 
together in our regression analysis —see regression (3) in Table 5. However, when included 
separately —see regressions (4) and (5)— they are both significant and have the expected 
sign. Both variables are highly correlated as described in this section 4 and note that the 
inclusion of one or the other does not change out estimation of the rest of the parameters, 
which remain robust to the election of proxies of institutional variables.  
 
 
4.4 Sensitivity analysis  
 
We test the robustness of our baseline specification on the determinants of inflation to 
changes in: (a) the sample of countries, and (b) the sample period under analysis. To test 
the differences directly we nest our model in such a way that the specification accounts for 
either country-group heterogeneity or time-heterogeneity as shown in equation (4)  
 
Heterogeneity across country groups. We test whether the parameters of our inflation equation 
are equal between high-income countries and non-high income countries, with the latter 
group including low- and middle-income countries. Hence we define a dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 for non-high income countries and we allow for interaction of this 
binary variable with all the explanatory variables in our regression equation.
18 Our 
regression equation contains the determinants of inflation as well as the interaction 
between the binary variable and each inflation determinants. These results are shown in 
Table 6 and 9 for the FE-IV estimation and the system-GMM estimation, respectively. We 
also test whether the parameters of the inflation equation are equal between low-income 
and non-low income countries by defining a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
only for low-income countries and zero otherwise. Tables 7 and 10 shows the results for 
                                                 
18 The detail of countries included in such groups follow empirical classifications made by The World 
Bank. Groupings can be fount in the Data Appendix   17
the FE-IV estimation and the system-GMM estimation, respectively.
19 In the context of 
our nested regressions —see equation (4)— we will be able to surely find point estimates 
for the parameters in the  ' Ψi  coefficient matrix that are statistically different from zero and, 
hence, find direct evidence of heterogeneity across groups of countries. 
 
We run and report the nested regression in line with the general equation (4) for our 
preferred estimations: (i) regressions (3) and (4) of Table 3, and (ii) regressions (4) and (5) 
of Table 5. From tables 6 through 10, we present 2 columns for each equation: the left 
hand side column —labeled as baseline— shows the parameter estimates of the  ' Bi  matrix 
while the next column —labeled as differential— shows the estimates of  ' Ψi  matrix 
associated to the variable in the same row. Therefore this column shows the incremental 
effect of belonging to the group for which the dummy variable is set to be equal to one.  
 
We find that estimation of our specifications do not change drastically. However, some 
results emerge from a closer look to the regressions in Tables 6 and 9. For the sake of 
simplicity we will call developing countries (industrial countries) to all the non-high (high) 
income economies. We first find that inflation in developing countries tends to be less 
persistent and that the disinflationary effects of inflation targeting are higher compared to 
industrial countries. On average, IT reduces inflation by more than 7% in developing 
countries, while the reduction in inflation is lower than 1% for industrial economies. 
Second, fixing exchange rates has significant deflationary effects for developing countries 
while the impact on inflation is negligible in industrial economies. Third, capital account 
openness plays a similar role (a deflationary one) for industrial and developing countries, 
whereas there is no evidence of heterogeneity for local financial development (and the 
significance of the latter variable disappears when controlling for country heterogeneity). 
Fourth, the relevant external inflation and the foreign output gap show no different effect 
across groups and these variables lose their statistical significance. This result confirms our 
finding that the effect of the latter variables is not as robust as the rest of inflation 
determinants. Finally, heterogeneity plays an important role when analyzing the coefficient 
of domestic output gap. Table 6 shows that the coefficient of output gap for developing 
countries is positive but lower than that of industrial economies. This finding reflects the 
                                                 
19 The simplicity of this exercise is also enhanced by the powerful conclusions we can extract from it. An 
alternative approach would be to re-estimate our models for different samples. We would surely find 
different point-estimates but they would say nothing about the statistical difference across country (or 
time) clusters because of the inexistence of a covariance matrix to perform such test.   18
fact that the inflationary output gap in industrial countries may be primarily determined by 
aggregate demand, while that of developing countries may be countervailed by more 
frequent or more intense supply shocks.  
 
Tables 7 and 10 show the estimation results for equation (4) when defining the country 
groups into poor (low-income) and non-poor countries (middle- and high-income). In 
contrast to the results presented in Tables 6 and 9, we find greater heterogeneity in the 
estimation results. First, we find that inflation is as persistent in poor countries as it is in 
non-poor ones. When comparing with our previous results, we can infer that the 
differences in persistence of developing countries vis-à-vis industrial countries are driven 
by the behavior of middle-income countries. Second, we find that IT contributes 
significantly to reduced inflation in both groups but the contribution is larger among poor 
countries. An analogous conclusion can be found for the exchange rate regime in place. 
Poor countries re more benefited from fixing exchange rates than non-poor countries (see 
Table 10). Finally, capital account openness has no additional effect for the poor relative to 
the non-poor, and the same holds true for the domestic output gap.  
 
Heterogeneity over time. We test whether the regression coefficients of the inflation equation 
remain constant over time. Hence we define a binary variable that takes the value of 1 after 
1995 and 0 otherwise. Tables 8 and 11 show the results of the inflation equation that 
includes interaction terms between the time dummy (as defined above) and all explanatory 
variables for the FE-IV and the GMM-system estimator, respectively. 
 
The FE-IV estimation shows that our main specification remains practically unchanged.  
First, the effect of the inflation targeting regime on inflation is concentrated in the earlier 
sample period (1990 to 1995), supporting the finding that the contribution of IT is the 
largest for converging-to-target countries. Second, the effect of capital openness has 
apparently reverted in the last 10 years, suggesting that we should not expect a deflationary 




In this paper we have analyzed the non-monetary determinants of inflation from the 
experience of large sample of countries. We have tried to disentangle the incidence of five 
groups of variables suggested by the theoretical and empirical literature: (a) very high   19
inflation episodes and persistence, (b) monetary and exchange-rate regimes, (c) openness, 
(d) structural variables and institutions, and (e) business-cycle-related variables. We extend 
the existing literature in five dimensions. First we assemble a large data set that comprises 
97 countries for the period from 1975 to 2005 for a wide variety of macroeconomic 
variables. Second, we estimate a broad specification that encompasses previous literature 
attempting to assess determinants of inflation through partial specifications. Third, we 
estimate such equations using annual and five-year-averages data to assess separately for 
short -term and long-term determinants of inflation, respectively. Fourth, we check for 
robustness of our results using different estimation econometric techniques that make 
different assumptions on the properties of our data and specification. Finally, we test for 
the sensitivity of our coefficient estimates across country groups and over time.  
 
Our results show the relevance of disciplinary effects in lowering inflation. First, inflation 
targeting is estimated to lower inflation when taking as control group all non-inflation 
targeters for which there is available information on macroeconomic variables, even after 
controlling for persistence and several other determinants of inflation. The same is true for 
countries adopting fixed exchange-rate regimes. For both regimes, we find that the 
disciplinary effect they exert on monetary authorities seems to be larger in developing 
countries than in industrial countries. These findings do not change when we use our 
samples 5-year average data (long-run inflation model). Second, we find support to the 
hypothesis that financial integration would help lower inflation through the disciplinary 
effect it exerts on monetary authorities; as predicted by the Mundell – Flemming model, 
under fixed exchange rate there is no point in pursuing inflationary monetary policy as it is 
ineffective. On the other hand, under floating exchange rate regimes, persistent 
depreciation of national currency ultimately leads to currency substitutions that are costly 
and that limit the operational framework of inflationary monetary policy (and monetary 
policy as a whole). Additionally capital openness serves as alternative source for public debt 
financing, alleviating the need for seigniorage and making central banks less enthusiastic 
about incurring into inflationary monetary policy. Third, we find robust support for the 
fiscal theory of inflation in the short-run using several alternative specifications and 
econometric approaches. Such evidence seems to be generalized for industrial and 
developing countries: fiscal discipline helps lower inflation. However, in the long-run 
specification, we are unable to find such a strong finding. This may seem natural if we 
presume that countries cannot persistently run fiscal deficits or surpluses in the long-run   20
and that the fiscal accounts should be balanced in the long-run. Fourth, we also find that 
wealthier countries, which are generally associated to having better institutions, exhibit 
better inflation performance: the richer a country gets, the lower its inflation rate is. Fifth, 
output gap —as expected in the literature— exhibits, on average, a positive influence on 
inflation. This finding highlights the fact that its demand-led component dominates the 
effect of positive supply shocks in the short-run. Interestingly, we find that industrial 
countries are more likely to experience inflationary episodes caused by aggregate demand 
forces than emerging market economies. A different interpretation would conclude that 
positive supply shocks that help lower inflation are more prone to be found in developing 
countries, which is also very appealing. Finally, we fail to find robust support to the idea 
that foreign output gap would influence local inflation for either the short-run or long-run 
inflation regression models.    21
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Previous Empirical Results 
Restricted to Cross Section or Panel Data estimations
Variable Author (s)  Conclusion anel Data / Cross Sectio Observations
Alfaro (2005) + / -  Panel Data  Imports and Exports 
Openness  Campillo and Miron (1996) (  -  ) Trade Openness
Catao and Terrones (2005) n.s.s. Panel Data
Gruben and McLeod (2004) (  -  ) Panel Data Trade Openness
Kamin, Marazzi and Schindler (2006) (  -  ) Panel Data Trade Openness 
Romer (1993) (  -  ) Panel Data Trade Openness (OECD)
Temple (2002) (  -  ) Panel Data Trade Openness
Terra (1998)  + / -  Panel Data Trade Openness (OECD)
Tytell and Wei (2004) (  -  ) Panel Data  Financial Openness
Institutions Aisen and Veiga (2006) (  -  ) Panel Data Political Instability
Cotarelli et al. (1998) (  -  ) Panel Data Transition Economies
Oil Price Inflation Catao and Terrones (2005) (  +  ) Panel Data
Exchange Rate Regime Alfaro (2005) (  -  ) Panel Data  Unflexibility of Exchange-Rate R.
Catao and Terrones (2005) n.s.s. Panel Data
Cotarelli et al. (1998) (  -  ) Panel Data Transition Economies
Fiscal Variables Alfaro (2005) (  -  ) Panel Data
Catao and Terrones (2005) (  -  ) Panel Data
Cotarelli et al. (1998) (  -  ) Transition Economies
Fischer, Sahay and Vegh (2002) (  -  ) Both Focus on hyperinflation episodes
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Table 2
Simple Correlation Analysis
Correlation and Statistical Significance
































Inflation 1 -0.147 *** -0.563 *** -0.233 *** -0.355 *** -0.281 *** -0.039 -0.224 *** -0.196 *** 0.185 -0.007 -0.024 -0.029
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.34) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.86) (0.57) (0.47)
Inflation Targeting -0.021 1 -0.163 *** -0.002 0.19 *** 0.197 *** 0.013 0.268 *** 0.247 *** -0.19 -0.014 -0.036 -0.045
(0.23) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.72) (0.35) (0.25)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.143 *** -0.152 *** 1 0.236 *** 0.196 *** 0.046 0.014 -0.048 0.01 -0.088 0.047 0.042 0.029
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.74) (0.26) (0.82) (0.04) (0.26) (0.31) (0.49)
Trade Openness -0.04 ** 0.005 0.214 *** 1 0.303 *** 0.051 0.005 0.073 * 0.303 *** -0.069 0.004 -0.018 -0.028
(0.03) (0.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.89) (0.07) (0.00) (0.08) (0.93) (0.66) (0.49)
Capital Openness -0.073 *** 0.179 *** 0.181 *** 0.288 *** 1 0.249 *** 0.521 *** 0.376 *** 0.565 *** -0.163 -0.023 -0.018 -0.042
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.57) (0.65) (0.30)
Fiscal Surplus -0.126 *** 0.17 *** 0.044 ** 0.053 ** 0.22 *** 1 -0.021 0.117 *** 0.222 *** -0.219 0.045 -0.071 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.33) (0.12) (1.00)
Domestic Private Credit -0.006 0.008 0.058 ** -0.002 0.496 *** -0.004 1 0.021 0.044 0.000 -0.061 0.000 0.037
(0.75) (0.64) (0.02) (0.91) (0.00) (0.84) (0.61) (0.28) (1.00) (0.13) (1.00) (0.36)
Democratic accountability -0.048 ** 0.248 *** -0.046 ** 0.075 ** 0.359 *** 0.116 *** 0.004 1 0.602 *** -0.184 0.024 -0.018 -0.034
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.82) (0.00) (0.00) (0.56) (0.65) (0.40)
Income per capita -0.047 ** 0.235 *** -0.001 0.3 ** 0.553 *** 0.191 *** 0.029 0.583 *** 1 -0.065 0.046 -0.012 -0.008
(0.01) (0.00) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.10) (0.24) 0.77 (0.85)
Relevant External Inflation 0.000 -0.160 *** -0.068 *** -0.061 *** -0.14 *** -0.19 *** -0.005 -0.148 *** -0.055 *** 1 -0.042 0.329 *** -0.115 ***
(0.99) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.78) (0.00) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00)
National Output Gap -0.070 *** -0.002 0.052 *** -0.007 0.01 0.064 *** -0.005 0.021 0.038 ** 0.017 1 -0.026 0.258 ***
(0.00) (0.92) (0.00) (0.68) (0.58) (0.00) (0.78) (0.25) (0.03) (0.34) (0.51) (0.00)
Cyclical comp.of oil prices 0.012 -0.001 0.013 0.023 -0.003 0.049 ** -0.018 0.001 0.001 0.058 0.055 *** 1 -0.367 ***
(0.52) (0.93) (0.47) (0.19) (0.86) (0.01) (0.30) (0.95) (0.93) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Foreign output gap 0.005 -0.028 *** 0.003 0.001 -0.022 0.028 -0.012 -0.008 0.002 0.073 0.101 *** 0.024 1




Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: Fixed Effects with Instrumental Variables
Sample. 1975-2005 (annual data)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.160 *** -0.033 0.196 * 0.141 0.139
Normalized and Instrumented value (1.97) (0.22) (1.87) (1.42) (1.39)
Hyper Inflation 0.348 *** 0.488 *** 0.357 *** 0.363 *** 0.364 ***
(9.29) (6.54) (8.24) (8.83) (8.82)
High Inflation 0.232 *** 0.308 *** 0.226 *** 0.230 *** 0.232 ***
(14.02) (8.29) (11.14) (11.85) (11.72)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.051 *** -0.045 *** -0.051 † *** -0.054 † *** -0.055 † ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.41) (4.25) (3.80) (4.16) (4.27)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.029 *** -0.037 *** -0.031 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (7.70) (5.97) (6.77) (7.70) (7.82)
Openness
Trade Openness -0.009 -0.012 ** -0.019 -0.010
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.81) (2.15) (1.43) (0.73)
Capital Openness -0.013 *** -0.011 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.94) (4.90) (4.79) (5.09) (5.06)
Relevant External Inflation 0.210 *** 0.412 *** 0.169 ** 0.080 0.127
Normalized  (3.11) (4.77) (2.10) (0.96) (1.57)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.204 *** -0.179 *** -0.251 *** -0.459 † *** -0.427 † ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.30) (4.46) (5.17) (5.15) (5.00)
Income per capita  -0.040 *** 0.012 *** -0.045 *** -0.051 † *** -0.047 † ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (3.67) (3.09) (3.46) (4.06) (4.20)
Domestic Private Credit 0.018 * -0.059 *** 0.028 ** 0.025 ** 0.024 **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.87) (4.65) (2.37) (2.26) (2.29)
Democratic accountability -0.002 -0.003 * -0.002 -0.002
(1.22) (1.65) (1.05) (0.74)
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
Cyclical component of oil prices 0.019 ** 0.017 0.013 0.026 ** 0.021 **
(2.01) (1.48) (1.14) (2.34) (2.05)
National Output Gap 0.238 *** 0.057 1.182 † *** 0.724 † ** 0.709 † **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented )  (3.60) (0.55) (3.06) (2.07) (2.02)
Foreign output gap (weighted by GDP) -0.204 -0.406 -0.565 ** -0.366
(0.93) (1.40) (2.11) (1.45)
Constant 0.467 *** 0.086 *** 0.504 *** 0.557 ** 0.512 ***
(4.80) (3.68) (4.47) (5.09) (5.22)
Hausman test (RE vs FE) p-value
Observations 1574 1574 1574 1570 1619
Number of Country number 65 65 65 65 65
R2 Overall 0.75 0.79 0.71 0.68 0.69
Note 1 : Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: The Hausman test favors FE regressions in all cases. Thus RE, being inconsistent, is no reported from equation 2
RE IV FE IV FE IV FE IV











Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: ADRL-based estimation techniques
Sample. 1975-2005 (annual data)
LONG RUN PARAMETERS
Inflation Related Variables
High Inflation 0.307 *** 0.324 *** 0.300 *** 0.295 *** 0.400 *** 0.258 *** 0.342 *** 0.451 ***
(22.77) (22.40) (22.13) (21.09) (4.69) (4.08) (6.77) (7.45)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.053 *** -0.038 *** -0.054 *** -0.063 *** -0.120 -0.045 -0.031 -0.02
(8.17) (5.86) (8.30) (8.67) (1.63) (-0.80) (0.59) (0.42)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.025 *** -0.028 *** -0.024 *** -0.035 *** -0.029 *** -0.025 *** -0.029 *** -0.036 ***
(10.26) (10.51) (9.84) (13.07) (3.11) (2.81) (4.12) (5.83)
Openness
Trade Openness 0.022 ** 0.016 * 0.021 ** 0.019 *** 0.153 ** 0.131 *** 0.103 ** 0.081 **
(2.51) (1.86) (2.45) (2.67) (2.45) (3.20) (2.23) (2.03)
Capital Openness -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 *** 0.008 -0.001 -0.02 * -0.016 **
(8.32) (8.44) (8.37) (8.02) (0.48) (0.19) (1.75) (2.03)
External relevant inflation 0.015 0.051 -0.241 0.159
Normalized  (0.23) (0.68) (0.84) (0.74)
Foreign Output Gap -0.17 -1.107
Trade Weighted Average (0.86) (1.54)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.122 *** -0.139 *** -0.143 *** -0.201 *** -0.489 * -0.246 * -0.31 -0.363 *
(% to GDP) (3.09) (3.29) (3.78) (4.81) (1.87) (1.72) (1.63) (1.85)
Income per capita  -0.007 0.002 -0.006 -0.056 -0.121 * -0.046
Logarithm (0.64) (0.26) (0.61) (0.49) (1.76) (0.63)
Domestic Private Credit 0.001 0.025
(0.41) (0.87)
Democratic accountability
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
National Output Gap 0.394 *** 0.432 *** 0.409 *** 0.399† -0.18 0.242 -0.083 0.009
Pooling († Pooling not imposed )  (5.09) (4.64) (5.18) (0.68) (0.88) (1.33) (0.46) (0.06)
Foreign output gap (weighted by GDP)
ERROR CORRECTION
Adjustment Velocity -0.513 *** -0.462 *** -0.511 *** -0.451 *** -0.861 *** -0.877 *** -0.83 *** -0.708 ***
(18.52) (17.62) (18.05) (14.74) (21.60) (18.06) (21.99) (23.31)
SHORT RUN PARAMETERS
Oil Price Gap -0.009 -0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.002 -0.011 *
Deviation (%) from trend (1.25) (0.23) (0.94) (1.62) (0.38) (1.69)
Δ Cap Openness 0.006 * 0.005 0.007 ** 0.005 0.015 -0.009 0.003 -0.001
(1.72) (1.52) (2.08) (1.39) (1.12) (1.47) (0.49) (0.22)
Δ Per Capita Income -0.069 -0.102 -0.364 * -0.279
In logarithms (0.57) (0.84) (1.91) (1.54)
Δ Fiscal Surplus 0.203 *** 0.234 *** 0.225 *** 0.217 *** 0.499 *** 0.283 *** 0.364 *** 0.318 ***
(3.42) (3.91) (3.96) (4.13) (5.18) (2.88) (4.24) (3.96)
Δ National Output Gap -0.331 ** -0.444 *** -0.34 ** -0.455 *** 0.195 -0.211 ** 0.105 -0.247 ***
(2.46) (8.48) (2.47) (5.81) (0.92) (2.47) (0.50) (3.12)
Δ Foreign Output Gap -0.37 * -0.187
(1.90) (0.56)
Constant -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.107 -0.001 0.055 0.004
(0.27) (0.36) (0.48) (0.44) (1.39) (0.02) (0.84) (0.32)
Note 1 : Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: Hausman Test's Null Hypothesis: Parameter Homogeneity
Note 3:  † denotes that parameter homogeneity is not imposed 
Pooled Mean Group 
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Table 4 (cont.)
Determinants of Inflation
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: ADRL-based estimation techniques
Sample. 1975-2005 (annual data)
LONG RUN PARAMETERS
Inflation Related Variables
High Inflation 0.346 *** 0.3483 *** 0.3467 *** 0.3483 *** 1.21 1.15 0.73 7.06
(29.63) (29.79) (29.85) (29.76) (0.27) (0.28) (0.39) (0.01)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.0455 *** -0.0451 *** -0.0442 *** -0.046 *** 0.83 0.02 0.2 0.78
(4.28) (4.29) (4.22) (4.38) (0.36) (0.90) (0.66) (0.38)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.0362 *** -0.0368 *** -0.0362 *** -0.0369 *** 0.18 0.09 0.56 0.02
(9.70) (9.85) (9.78) (9.91) (0.67) (0.76) (0.45) (0.88)
Openness
Trade Openness 0.0502 *** 0.0437 *** 0.0515 *** 0.0431 *** 4.49 8.21 3.24 2.5
(2.95) (2.60) (3.04) (2.61) (0.03) (0.00) (0.07) (0.11)
Capital Openness -0.0113 *** -0.0114 *** -0.0112 *** -0.0115 *** 1.62 2.48 0.4 0.22
(4.05) (4.09) (4.08) (4.14) (0.20) (0.11) (0.53) (0.64)
External relevant inflation 0.1103 0.1004 0.84 0.29
Normalized  (0.89) (0.80) (0.36) (0.59)
Foreign Output Gap -0.0212 1.83
Trade Weighted Average (0.07) (0.18)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.3216 *** -0.3269 *** -0.3119 *** -0.334 *** 2.02 0.6 0.8 0.72
(% to GDP) (4.45) (4.56) (4.37) (4.67) (0.15) (0.44) (0.37) (0.40)
Income per capita  -0.018 -0.0104 -0.0182 0.19 3.28 0.29
Logarithm (1.09) (0.65) (1.12) (0.66) (0.07) (0.59)
Domestic Private Credit 0.0024 0.72
(0.77) (0.40)
Democratic accountability
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
National Output Gap 0.2261 * 0.2349 * 0.2254 * 0.218 * 9.22 1.49 8.97 †
Pooling († Pooling not imposed )  (1.77) (1.83) (1.78) (1.74) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00)
Foreign output gap (weighted by GDP)
ERROR CORRECTION
Adjustment Velocity -0.507 *** -0.5038 *** -0.5068 *** -0.5027 ***
(34.53) (34.59) (34.73) (34.77)
SHORT RUN PARAMETERS
Oil Price Gap -0.0055 -0.0036 -0.0037
Deviation (%) from trend (0.83) (0.56) (0.57)
Δ Cap Openness 0.0036 0.0031 0.0032 0.0032
(1.34) (1.13) (1.18) (1.18)
Δ Per Capita Income -0.1088 * -0.1265 **
In logarithms (1.92) (2.22)
Δ Fiscal Surplus 0.2213 *** 0.2153 *** 0.2203 *** 0.2172 ***
(5.45) (5.35) (5.49) (5.42)
Δ National Output Gap -0.2866 *** -0.4187 *** -0.2707 *** -0.4182 ***
(3.43) (8.28) (3.25) (8.29)
Δ Foreign Output Gap 0.0375
(0.28)
Constant
Note 1 : Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: Hausman Test's Null Hypothesis: Parameter Homogeneity
Note 3:  † denotes that parameter homogeneity is not imposed 
Dynamic Fixed Effects Hausman Test




Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: System GMM
Sample. 1975-2005 (five-year averages)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.153 ** 0.176 ** 0.194 *** 0.211 *** 0.197 ***
Normalized and Instrumented value (2.13) (2.52) (3.51) (4.14) (3.55)
Hyper Inflation 0.536 *** 0.513 *** 0.491 *** 0.489 *** 0.487 ***
(4.38) (4.26) (5.49) (5.46) (5.31)
High Inflation 0.321 *** 0.321 *** 0.352 *** 0.349 *** 0.352 ***
(8.70) (10.00) (10.10) (10.18) (9.99)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.034 *** -0.032 *** -0.033 *** -0.033 *** -0.034 ***
(4.40) (3.74) (5.31) (5.27) (5.41)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.028 *** -0.027 *** -0.027 *** -0.027 *** -0.027 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (7.82) (7.61) (7.77) (7.51) (7.77)
Openness
Trade Openness -0.004 -0.004
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.42) (0.53)
Capital Openness -0.010 *** -0.009 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 *** -0.008 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.36) (4.78) (4.26) (4.25) (4.84)
Relevant External Inflation 0.326 *** 0.308 ** 0.392 *** 0.397 *** 0.385 ***
Normalized  (2.85) (2.22) (3.99) (4.00) (3.96)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.076 -0.109
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.40) (0.44)
Income per capita  -0.000 0.000 -0.004 -0.006 **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.07) (0.08) (1.25) (2.29)
Domestic Private Credit -0.021 * -0.020 ** -0.011 -0.015 **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.84) (2.24) (1.25) (2.03)
Democratic accountability 0.001
(0.38)
Constant 0.121 *** 0.113 *** 0.134 *** 0.147 *** 0.106 ***
(3.69) (3.33) (5.00) (5.12) (7.35)
Observations 360 355 435 435 435
Number of (mean) cnum 77 77 97 97 97
Hansen Test 0.76 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.62
Instrumentos 27.00 17.00 15.00 14.00 14.00
AR1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
AR2 0.46 0.44 0.47 0.50 0.46
Note 1 : Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses
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Table 6
Determinants of Inflation: Country Heterogeneity
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: Fixed Effects with Instrumental Variables
Sample. 1975-2005 (annual data)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.512 *** -0.413 ** 0.496 *** -0.402 **
Normalized and Instrumented value (4.16) (2.50) (4.32) (2.55)
Hyper Inflation 0.372 *** 0.371 ***
(8.32) (8.47)
High Inflation 0.150 *** 0.086 ** 0.176 *** 0.061
(4.15) (2.06) (5.27) (1.56)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting 0.003† -0.080† *** -0.009† -0.070† ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.17) (3.02) (0.54) (2.86)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.014 -0.020 -0.006 -0.028 **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.11) (1.45) (0.57) (2.33)
Openness
Trade Openness -0.069 0.068
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.27) (1.21)
Capital Openness -0.003 -0.011 * -0.004 -0.010 *
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.51) (1.81) (0.71) (1.72)
Relevant External Inflation 0.154 -0.103 0.078 0.032
Normalized  (0.67) (0.42) (0.37) (0.14)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.701† *** 0.207† -0.435† ** -0.048†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (3.19) (0.85) (2.56) (0.24)
Income per capita  -0.002† -0.050 -0.015 -0.033
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.04) (1.30) (0.65) (1.23)
Domestic Private Credit 0.020 -0.010 0.012 0.001
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.98) (0.36) (0.68) (0.03)
Democratic accountability -0.011 0.009
(1.31) (1.01)
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
Cyclical component of oil prices -0.009 0.042 -0.010 0.037
(0.36) (1.48) (0.39) (1.28)
National Output Gap 3.041† *** -2.586† ** 2.148† ** -1.706† *
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented )  (2.74) (2.20) (2.54) (1.83)
Foreign output gap (weighted by GDP) -0.472 -0.055
(0.62) (0.07)
Constant 0.473 *** 0.444 ***
(4.07) (4.57)
Observations 1570 1619
Number of Country number 65 65
R2 Overall 0.17 0.24
Note 1 : Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: The Hausman test favors FE regressions in all cases.
Note 3: Country heterogeneity is accomplished thorough the inclusion of an interactive dummy variable which is set equal 
to zero for high income economies and equal to one for middle and low income economies 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects Instrumental Variables 
Estimates
(2)




Determinants of Inflation: Country Heterogeneity
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: Fixed Effects with Instrumental Variables
Sample. 1975-2005 (annual data)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.251 *** -0.148 0.262 *** -0.158
Normalized and Instrumented value (4.48) (1.07) (4.80) (1.16)
Hyper Inflation 0.422 *** -0.071 0.415 *** -0.063
(7.30) (0.91) (7.42) (0.81)
High Inflation 0.194 *** 0.049 * 0.194 *** 0.050 *
(12.29) (1.76) (12.53) (1.79)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.035† *** -0.050† * -0.038† *** -0.048† *
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (2.95) (1.70) (3.37) (1.73)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.032 *** 0.001 -0.031 *** -0.000
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (6.33) (0.07) (6.33) (0.07)
Openness
Trade Openness -0.017 0.014
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.87) (0.48)
Capital Openness -0.011 *** -0.002 -0.011 *** -0.002
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (3.58) (0.48) (3.62) (0.45)
Relevant External Inflation 0.172 -0.244 0.169 -0.151
Normalized  (1.34) (1.41) (1.37) (0.93)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.435† *** -0.175† -0.398† *** -0.166†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (3.70) (0.94) (3.71) (0.94)
Income per capita  -0.054† *** 0.015† -0.051† *** 0.016†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (2.67) (0.57) (3.06) (0.68)
Domestic Private Credit 0.037 *** -0.043 * 0.034 *** -0.038
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (2.68) (1.65) (2.67) (1.50)
Democratic accountability -0.003 0.002
(0.83) (0.42)
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
Cyclical component of oil prices 0.013 0.027 0.008 0.023
(0.74) (1.17) (0.49) (1.09)
National Output Gap 1.275† *** -0.912† 1.260† *** -0.892†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented )  (3.64) (1.48) (3.64) (1.45)
Foreign output gap (weighted by GDP) -0.383 -0.107
(0.90) (0.20)
Constant 0.511 *** 0.467 ***
(4.57) (4.76)
Observations 1570 1619
Number of Country number 65 65
R2 Overall 0.51 0.54
Note 1 : Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: The Hausman test favors FE regressions in all cases. 
Note 3: Country heterogeneity is accomplished thorough the inclusion of an interactive dummy variable which is set equal 
to zero for high and middle income economies and equal to one low income economies 
Fixed Effects and Random Effects Instrumental Variables 
Estimates
(2)




Determinants of Inflation: Country Heterogeneity
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: Fixed Effects with Instrumental Variables
Sample. 1975-2005 (annual data)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.219 ** -0.305 *** 0.193 ** -0.212 ***
Normalized and Instrumented value (2.44) (3.43) (2.25) (3.47)
Hyper Inflation 0.327 *** 0.000 0.337 *** 0.000
(8.28) (.) (8.91) (.)
High Inflation 0.222 *** 0.002 0.229 *** -0.009
(12.42) (0.10) (12.84) (0.39)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.063† -0.004† -0.063† * -0.004†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.53) (0.14) (1.83) (0.16)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.029 *** -0.006 -0.032 *** 0.002
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (6.12) (1.23) (5.53) (0.18)
Openness
Trade Openness -0.008 0.036
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.40) (1.31)
Capital Openness -0.012 *** -0.002 -0.011 *** -0.004
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (3.79) (0.41) (3.66) (0.58)
Relevant External Inflation 0.093 0.190 0.025 0.344
Normalized  (0.40) (0.55) (0.23) (0.93)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Fiscal Surplus -0.316† -0.509† -0.326† ** -0.448†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.35) (0.78) (2.14) (0.96)
Income per capita  -0.073† * 0.060† -0.060† * 0.042†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.75) (0.74) (1.91) (0.86)
Domestic Private Credit 0.038 -0.063 0.030 * -0.046
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.47) (0.91) (1.72) (0.95)
Democratic accountability 0.009 -0.017
(0.60) (0.68)
Cyclical Domestic and Foreign Variales
Cyclical component of oil prices 0.033 ** -0.030 0.035 ** -0.019
(2.01) (1.10) (2.49) (0.76)
National Output Gap 0.791† ** -0.208† 0.728† * -0.002†
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented )  (2.08) (0.29) (1.95) (0.00)
Foreign output gap (weighted by GDP) -0.179 1.104
(0.59) (1.25)
Constant 0.692 ** -0.418 0.620 ** -0.348
(2.29) (0.73) (2.34) (0.85)
Observations 1570 1619
Number of Country number 65 65
R2 Overall 0.67 0.69
Note 1 : Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: The Hausman test favors FE regressions in all cases. 
Note 3: Country heterogeneity is accomplished thorough the inclusion of an interactive dummy variable which is set equal 
to one for the period comprising years 1995 to 2005 and equal to zero for the rest
Fixed Effects and Random Effects Instrumental Variables 
Estimates
(2)





Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: System GMM
Sample. 1975-2005 (five-year averages)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.371 *** -0.169 * 0.391 *** -0.213 **
Normalized and Instrumented value (5.16) (1.80) (5.59) (2.29)
Hyper Inflation 0.475 *** 0.479 ***
(5.03) (4.85)
High Inflation 0.431 *** -0.089 0.401 *** -0.057
(5.64) (1.05) (7.27) (0.87)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting 0.001 -0.041 *** 0.006 -0.048 ***
(0.11) (3.25) (0.80) (4.20)
Exchange Rate Regime 0.001 -0.035 *** 0.002 -0.036 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.33) (6.57) (0.65) (6.49)
Openness
Capital Openness -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.003
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.38) (0.91) (1.45) (0.67)
Relevant External Inflation 0.424 ** 0.032 0.484 *** -0.021
Normalized  (2.47) (0.15) (3.06) (0.10)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Income per capita  0.006 -0.012
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.78) (1.36)
Domestic Private Credit 0.009 -0.031
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.24) (2.87)
Constant -0.054 0.215 ** -0.006 0.129 ***
(0.72) (2.55) (0.45) (5.93)
Observations 435 435
Number of (mean) cnum 97 97




Note 1 : Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: Country heterogeneity is accomplished thorough the inclusion of an interactive dummy variable which is set equal 
to zero for high income economies and equal to one for middle and low income economies 
(1) (2)
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Table 10
Determinants of Inflation
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: System GMM
Sample. 1975-2005 (five-year averages)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.277 *** -0.104 0.264 *** -0.095
Normalized and Instrumented value (3.52) (1.02) (3.10) (0.88)
Hyper Inflation 0.252 *** 0.326 *** 0.254 *** 0.329 ***
(2.91) (3.09) (3.30) (3.28)
High Inflation 0.354 *** -0.013 0.352 *** -0.010
(5.18) (0.17) (5.67) (0.14)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.021 *** -0.031 ** -0.022 *** -0.031 ***
(3.06) (2.33) (3.41) (2.73)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.016 ** -0.019 ** -0.018 *** -0.016 **
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (2.53) (2.31) (2.86) (2.12)
Openness
Capital Openness -0.008 ** 0.002 -0.008 *** 0.003
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (2.47) (0.45) (2.85) (0.71)
Relevant External Inflation 0.260 0.231 0.281 ** 0.223
Normalized  (1.76) (1.11) (2.07) (1.12)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Income per capita  -0.006 0.004
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.76) (0.35)
Domestic Private Credit -0.006 -0.016
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (0.72) (1.12)
Constant 0.127 0.014 0.075 *** 0.049
(1.34) (0.13) (3.10) (1.59)
Observations 435 435
Number of (mean) cnum 97 97




Note 1 : Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: Country heterogeneity is accomplished thorough the inclusion of an interactive dummy variable which is set equal 
to zero for high and middle income economies and equal to one low income economies 
(1) (2)
Baseline Incremental Baseline Incremental
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Table 11
Determinants of Inflation: Time Heterogeneity
Dependend Variable: Normalized Inflation
Estimation: System GMM
Sample. 1975-2005 (five-year averages)
Inflation Related Variables
Lagged Inflation 0.185 *** 0.045 0.179 *** 0.010
Normalized and Instrumented value (3.88) (0.41) (3.73) (0.08)
Hyper Inflation 0.491 *** -0.018 0.479 *** -0.021
(6.02) (0.18) (5.34) (0.19)
High Inflation 0.344 *** 0.033 0.347 *** 0.016
(9.68) (0.64) (9.29) (0.27)
Monetary and Exchange-Rate Regime
Inflation Targeting -0.022 * -0.007 -0.020 * -0.010
(1.88) (0.57) (1.78) (0.90)
Exchange Rate Regime -0.027 *** 0.004 -0.026 *** 0.002
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (5.85) (0.65) (5.74) (0.33)
Openness
Capital Openness -0.013 *** 0.012 *** -0.013 *** 0.011 ***
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (4.90) (3.98) (5.38) (4.39)
Relevant External Inflation 0.221 * 0.027 0.209 * 0.102
Normalized  (1.91) (0.08) (1.79) (0.29)
Structural / Institutional Variables
Income per capita  -0.005 -0.002
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.46) (0.56)
Domestic Private Credit -0.015 -0.002
Lagged († Not lagged but Instrumented ) (1.27) (0.16)
Constant 0.158 *** -0.012 0.120 *** -0.028
(4.18) (0.29) (6.69) (1.27)
Observations 435 435
Number of (mean) cnum 97 97




Note 1 : Absolute value of Z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 1%
Note 2: Country heterogeneity is accomplished thorough the inclusion of an interactive dummy variable which is set equal 
to one for the period comprising years 1995 to 2005 and equal to zero for the rest
(1) (2)
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Figure 3 
Distribution of Cross Country Inflations 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation 
Note: Kernel Density plots for the Distribution of Cross-Country Inflations for each period: 1975-2005.  
Note 2: Inflation is defined on decimal basis, thus 1% is equivalent to 0.01.    37
 
Figure 4 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Inflation (normalized) 3044 0.119 0.153 -0.150 0.996
Trade Openness 3175 0.685 0.418 0.063 4.561
Capital Openness 3114 0.146 1.557 -1.767 2.603
Relevant External Inflation 3379 0.041 0.029 -0.001 0.143
Fiscal Surplus (% GDP) 2420 -0.035 0.049 -0.451 0.206
Per capita Income (in logs) 3243 8.510 1.157 6.130 10.889
Domestic Private Credit 3152 0.630 5.242 0.000 152.318
Democratic Accountability 3119 3.708 1.647 0.000 6.000
Cyclical component of Oil Prices 3379 -0.004 0.166 -0.384 0.296
National Output Gap 3243 0.000 0.028 -0.368 0.270
Foreign Output Gap (GDP weighted av.) 3379 -0.001 0.008 -0.021 0.017
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Table A3
Foreign Monetary Policy Reference Countries
Name 
Algeria 3 El Salvador 8 Madagascar 3 Slovenia 4
Argentina 8 Ethiopia 8 Malawi 8 South Africa 8
Australia 8 Finland 4 Malaysia 8 Spain 4
A u s t r i a 4 F r a n c e 4 M a l i 3 S r i  L a n k a 589
Bangladesh 8 9 Gabon 3 Mauritius 9 Sudan 8
Belgium 4 Gambia, The 8 9 Mexico 8 Sweden 4
Benin 3 Germany 8 Morocco 3 Switzerland 4
Bolivia 8 Ghana 8 Netherlands 4 Syrian Arab Republic8
Botswana 8 10 Greece 4 8 New Zealand 1 Tanzania 8
Brazil 8 Guatemala 8 Nicaragua 8 Thailand 8
Bulgaria 4 8 Guinea 8 Niger 3 Togo 3
Burkina Faso 3 Haiti 8 Nigeria 8 Trinidad and Tobago89
Cameroon 3 Honduras 8 Norway 4 Tunisia 3
Canada 8 Hong Kong, China 8 Oman 8 Turkey 8
Chad 3 Hungary 4 8 Pakistan 8 Uganda 8
Chile 8 Iceland 4 8 Panama 8 United Arab Emirate8
China 8 India 8 9 Papua New Guinea 9 United Kingdom 4
Colombia 8 Indonesia 8 Paraguay 8 Uruguay 8
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8 Iran, Islamic Rep. 8 Peru 8 Venezuela, RB 8
Congo, Rep. 3 Ireland 4 9 Philippines 8 Zambia 8
Costa Rica 8 Israel 8 Poland 4 Zimbabwe 8
Cote d'Ivoire 3 Italy 4 Portugal 4
Croatia 4 Jamaica 8 Romania 8
C y p r u s 3J a p a n 8R w a n d a 8
Czech Republic 4 Jordan 8 Saudi Arabia 8
Denmark 4 Kenya 8 Senegal 3
Dominican Republic 8 Korea, Rep. 8 Sierra Leone 8 9
Ecuador 8 Lebanon 8 Singapore 6
Egypt, Arab Rep. 8 Luxembourg 2 Slovak Republic 4
Base Countries
Australia (1) Germany (4) Portugal (7) South Africa(10)
Belgium (2) India (5) United States (8)
France (3) Malaysia (6)  United Kingdom (9)
Note 1: We use inflation of the base-country as our measure of Relevant External Inflation
Note 2: Numbers to the right refer to base country. A country may have multiple bases. 
Note 3: Country base for the US is assumed to comprise EMU and Japan




Data Sources and definitions
(normalized) Inflation rate CPI inflation rate/(1+CPI inflation) WDI (2007) 
Fiscal Surplus Overall Government Budget Balance (surplus)/GDP GFS and EIU
Financial development Domestic credit to private sector /GDP WDI (2007)
Exchange-rate regime Discrete Variable Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) + IMF (AREAER)
GDP per capita  GDP per capita (2000 US $) WDI (2007)
Trade openness (Exports + Imports) / GDP WDI (2007)
Inflation Targeting Dummy Variable Corbo et al. (2002); Truman (2003); Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel (2007)
Capital Openness Four Dummy variables reported in IMF's AREAER Chinn and Ito (2002, 2005)
Relevant External Inflation Own elaboration based on Di Giovanni and Shambaugh (2007) See Table A2
Democratic Accountability  International Country Risk Guide Political Risk Services
Oil Price  International oil price average (UK Brent, WTI, Dubai) IMF's IFS 
National Output Gap Cyclical component (HP filtered ) of real GDP as percent 
deviation from trend WDI (2007)





AREAER: Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, several issues
EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit
GFS: Government Financial Statistics
IFS: International Financial Statistics
WDI: Word Development Indicators
Variable Description Source
 Table A4
Countries grouped by income level 
World Bank 2007 Classification
1 Burkina Faso 1 Bulgaria 1 Argentina 1 Australia 1 Cyprus
2 Cote d'Ivoire 2 Bolivia 2 Botswana 2 Austria 2 Hong Kong, China
3 Ethiopia 3 Brazil 3 Chile 3 Belgium 3 Israel
4 Ghana 4 Cameroon 4 Costa Rica 4 Canada 4 Saudi Arabia
5 Gambia, The 5 Congo, Rep. 5 Gabon 5 Switzerland 5 Singapore
6 Haiti 6 Colombia 6 Croatia 6 Denmark
7 India 7 Dominican Republic 7 Hungary 7 Spain
8 Kenya 8 Algeria 8 Lebanon 8 Finland
9 Madagascar 9 Ecuador 9 Mexico 9 France
10 Malawi 10 Egypt, Arab Rep. 10 Mauritius 10 United Kingdom
11 Niger 11 Guatemala 11 Malaysia 11 Greece
12 Nigeria 12 Honduras 12 Panama 12 Ireland
13 Pakistan 13 Indonesia 13 Poland 13 Iceland
14 Papua New Guinea 14 Iran, Islamic Rep. 14 Trinidad and Tobago 14 Italy
15 Rwanda 15 Jamaica 15 Turkey 15 Japan
16 Sudan 16 Jordan 16 Uruguay 16 Korea, Rep.
17 Senegal 17 Sri Lanka 17 Venezuela, RB 17 Luxembourg
18 Sierra Leone 18 Morocco 18 South Africa 18 Netherlands
19 Chad 19 Nicaragua 19 Norway
20 Togo 20 Peru 20 New Zealand
21 Tanzania 21 Philippines 21 Portugal
22 Uganda 22 Paraguay 22 Sweden
23 Congo, Dem. Rep. 23 El Salvador 23 United States
24 Zambia 24 Syrian Arab Republic
25 Zimbabwe 25 Thailand
26 Tunisia
Note: This country sample comprises countries actually used in estimations. 
Our complete data set contains data for 109 countries (incomplete for 12 of them)
Source: World Bank (2007)
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